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Cass R. Sunstein* 
Consider the following cases: 
1. Jones, who is wealthy, is willing to pay $1,000 and no more 
for a new television set. Jones would enjoy a new television set, but he 
already has a good television set, and he would not, in fact, gain a great 
deal from a new one. But because he is so wealthy, he would be better 
off with the television set than with $1,000. 
2. Smith, who is poor, is willing to pay $75 and no more for a new 
television set. Smith would greatly enjoy a new television set; he does 
not now have one. He would be better off with the television set than 
with $75. But because he is poor, he would be worse off with the tele-
vision set at a price in excess of $75. 
3.  Jenkins, who is poor and disabled, is willing to pay $20 and no 
more for a workplace accommodation that will enable her to work. The 
cost of the accommodation to her employer is $150. If the accommo-
dation is made, Jenkins will gain far more in terms of welfare than the 
employer (and its customers) will lose. 
4. Wilson, who is a very wealthy New Yorker, would be willing to 
pay $1,000,000 for a summer home in Aspen, Colorado. It turns out that 
if Wilson bought that summer home, she would not much enjoy it, and 
in the long run she would not use it. She would miss her friends and 
her life in New York. In the end, she would be better off with $1,000,000 
than with the summer home in Aspen. 
5. Andrews, who is poor, is not willing to pay $600 for a health 
insurance plan. It turns out that if Andrews bought that health insur-
ance plan, her life would be much better; she would be far healthier and 
her chronic back problem would be greatly improved. For her, the loss of 
$600 would be much smaller than the gain, in terms of welfare, from 
purchase of the health insurance plan. 
In all of these tales, there seems to be a disjunction between how much 
people are willing to pay for a certain good and how much welfare they 
would obtain from receiving that good. This disjunction might well seem 
odd, because economically oriented law professors (and many policymak-
ers) often work with the idea of “willingness to pay” (WTP).1 Their goal 
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is to achieve efªciency or to maximize wealth, and WTP is the metric for 
assessing both efªciency and wealth.2 
If efªciency is to be understood in terms of WTP, and if efªciency, 
so understood, is the appropriate foundation for policy and law, there will 
be many implications. Consider, for example, the domain of climate change. 
Should international policy be made only after asking how much people 
are willing to pay to avoid the adverse effects of climate change? Or con-
sider the areas of water pollution, consumer product safety, and occupational 
safety and health regulation. Should we evaluate water pollution controls, 
or protection against risks from consumer products and the workplace, by 
asking how much people are willing to pay to prevent various bad conse-
quences? If WTP provides the governing measure, policy judgments will 
be signiªcantly affected. 
It is not unreasonable for skeptics to ask: Why should anyone care 
about WTP? The natural answer lies in welfare.3 If people are willing to pay 
very little for a good, they would appear unlikely to gain much from re-
ceiving it. And if people are willing to pay a great deal for a good, they 
will probably gain a lot if they are able to obtain it. The cases of Jones 
and Smith are exemplary of this basic claim. 
There is no plausible argument that WTP is important in itself.4 If 
policymakers should attend to it, it is because of its connection to welfare.5 
If that connection is poor, then the use of WTP will often be vulnerable, 
even by reference to the criterion that most interests those who use it. 
This Article will identify two reasons why WTP is likely to be a crude 
proxy for welfare and will offer some discussion of the implications of 
this conclusion for law and policy. 
The ªrst and more straightforward problem is that sometimes the 
beneªciaries of law do not pay all or most of its cost. In those circum-
stances, an inquiry into WTP will not tell us all that we need to know in 
terms of welfare. This problem, captured in Jenkins’ tale, suggests that 
efªciency and welfare may not march hand-in-hand. Inefªcient programs 
can be welfare-promoting—a fact that raises serious challenges for those 
considering when to depart from the outcome suggested by cost-beneªt 
analysis (CBA). I shall suggest that when those who gain from regulation 
are poor, and when those who lose from regulation are wealthy, regula-
tion may well be welfare-promoting even when it fails CBA. A more general 
implication, familiar to utilitarians but playing little role in contemporary 
economic analysis of the law, is that substantial redistribution to the poor 
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may be justiªed on the ground that it increases social welfare. Because an 
extra dollar is worth more to the poor than to the wealthy, redistribution 
will increase overall welfare (at least if a system of redistribution can be 
designed without creating harmful incentives). 
The second and more fundamental problem is that people are often 
willing to pay a great deal for goods whose acquisition does not improve 
their welfare. WTP and welfare can be mismatched because of failures in 
“affective forecasting,” excessive optimism, myopia, and related phenomena. 
The cases of Wilson and Andrews show how affective forecasting may go 
wrong. It should be clear that if failures in affective forecasting lead to 
serious blunders, and if planners are in a position to anticipate those blun-
ders, it will be necessary to rethink many questions in law and policy, 
including such areas as consumer protection, occupational safety and health, 
and environmental law. 
As we shall also see, increases in gross domestic product (GDP) do 
not produce increases in self-reported happiness, and the relationship 
between economic growth and welfare remains obscure. At a minimum, I 
shall suggest that policymakers should focus directly on the ingredients 
of welfare—a focus suggesting, for example, that a great deal of attention 
should be paid to methods for reducing mental illness. 
Before we proceed, I should emphasize the limited nature of my ar-
gument. I am not dealing with the fact that people may be willing to pay 
something to satisfy malicious or sadistic preferences. Many people be-
lieve that such preferences should not count even if people are willing to 
pay a great deal to satisfy them.6 I share that belief but I will not attempt 
to defend it here. Nor am I dealing with non-welfarist objections to the 
use of WTP—as in, for example, the claim that people have certain rights, 
whatever their WTP.7 My sole concern is the relationship between WTP 
and welfare. Finally, I will spend little time on the problem of “adaptive 
preferences”—a problem that arises when people’s preferences are adap-
tive to existing opportunities, including deprivation.8 Suppose that people 
are not willing to pay much to obtain a good, simply because they con-
sider that good to be unavailable. (Andrews’ tale is a possible example.) 
If so, it is possible that law and policy should nonetheless make that good 
available, in the hope that its availability will ultimately improve peo-
ple’s welfare. I do not engage that point directly here, though it is con-
nected with the general problem of affective forecasting. 
The argument comes in four parts. Part I sketches the welfarist argu-
ment on behalf of WTP, attempting to specify the domain in which that 
argument is most secure. Part II shows that when the beneªciaries of law 
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do not pay for it, law may increase welfare even though it is inefªcient. 
For law and regulation, an important implication is that welfare effects 
cannot be fully evaluated without an understanding of who is bearing the 
costs and who is receiving the beneªts. This understanding is crucial to 
appreciating the welfare effects of regulation, not merely the distributive 
effects. Part III emphasizes ambiguities in the idea of “welfare,” explor-
ing objective accounts and stressing that it is important to attend to peo-
ple’s experiences and not only their choices. Part III also investigates efforts 
to measure subjective happiness and reported life-satisfaction. A highly 
suggestive puzzle is that there appears to be little or no correlation be-
tween economic growth and reported life-satisfaction. Finally, Part IV 
explores failures in affective forecasting and the general problem of 
“miswanting.” Because of these failures, people are sometimes willing to 
pay a great deal for goods that do not promote their welfare and are some-
times unwilling to pay much for goods that would promote their welfare. 
It follows that if welfare is our lodestar, an emphasis on WTP may lead 
in the wrong directions. A serious problem is that planners may not be in 
a good position to know when this is so, but we are beginning to obtain 
some helpful clues. 
I.  The Welfarist Argument for WTP 
If people’s subjective experience is our central concern, the use of WTP 
has many advantages. It is not easy to measure welfare. By contrast, poli-
cymakers can often work with WTP. WTP might be seen as an administrable 
way of ascertaining the welfare consequences of one or another approach.9 
Moreover, there are deªning or “core” cases in which the use of WTP 
makes a great deal of sense. For example, consider a large city called Pare-
toville where everyone has the same income and wealth. Suppose that 
some citizens of Paretoville are deciding whether to enter into a contract 
to buy a certain good. The good might be a computer, a diminution of a 
mortality risk (say, by 1/10,000), an insurance policy, or an investment 
opportunity. Suppose that the relevant citizens are willing to pay $X, but 
no more, to buy the good. If the government asks those citizens to pay 
more than $X, it would seem to be doing them no favors. Why should the 
ofªcials of Paretoville require people to pay more than such people see 
ªt? If we are interested in welfare, the citizens’ refusal to pay more than 
$X should be respected, certainly if they have enough information to make 
an informed decision. At least at ªrst glance, the adequately informed 
citizens of Paretoville should be taken to be in the best position to know 
whether their welfare will be improved if they make the purchase.10 
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Consider a small experiment I conducted at Harvard Law School. 
About thirty-ªve students were asked the following question: 
Under existing regulation of arsenic in drinking water, you face 
an annual cancer risk of one in 500,000. The government is pro-
posing to tighten the regulation, in a way that would decrease 
the risk to one in 600,000. How much would you be willing to pay 
each year, in increased water bills, to favor the government’s 
proposal? 
(a) $25 
(b) $50 
(c) $100 
(d) $200 
(e) $400 
(f) over  $400 
The median answer was $50. Only seven people were willing to pay 
more than $100. The result was a median valuation of a statistical life (VSL) 
of $5 million, representing the WTP of $50 to eliminate a risk of one in 
100,000.11 If people are assumed to be rational, they should not be re-
quired to pay an amount in excess of $50 to eliminate a risk for whose 
elimination they are willing to pay only $50. 
One of the virtues of the use of the WTP in the core cases is that it 
works for poor people, such as Smith in case two above, no less than for 
rich people. If the citizens of Paretoville are poor, and if the amount they 
are willing to pay is very low, we do not help them if we give them an insur-
ance policy, or a computer, or a reduction of risk that exceeds their WTP. 
Even if they would beneªt a great deal from such a good, they would lose 
more, by their own lights, from being forced to buy it at an amount that 
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exceeds their WTP. Let us suppose, then, that the core cases for use of WTP 
are those in which the relevant people, armed with adequate information, 
seek to purchase a good at some price $X, and the question is whether a 
planner should ask them to buy that good at a price in excess of $X. 
To accept the use of WTP in the core cases, it is entirely possible to 
agree that a measure of redistribution would be appropriate. Let us alter 
the problem slightly and assume that Paretoville has a signiªcant amount 
of inequality. Perhaps private sources, or government, should provide poor 
people with the good at a partial subsidy or even for free (that is, without 
cost to those who are beneªted). Perhaps disabled people, such as Jenkins in 
case three above, should receive an accommodation, even if they are not 
willing to pay much for it. But as a practical matter, legal interventions need 
not, and often do not, amount to a subsidy to those who beneªt from them. 
When regulation is imposed, people may have to pay for what they get. 
After the enactment of workers’ compensation regulation, nonunion-
ized workers faced a dollar-for-dollar wage reduction, corresponding almost 
perfectly to the expected value of the beneªts they received.12 For drink-
ing water regulation, something similar is involved. When the government 
eliminates carcinogenic substances from the water supply, it is not as if 
water companies bear the cost. The cost of regulations is passed on to con-
sumers in the form of higher water bills.13 Smith’s tale, in case two above, is 
a mundane example. 
For purposes of evaluating the welfarist argument for WTP in the 
core cases, it does not matter if the existing distribution of income is un-
just or if poor people are, in an intelligible sense, coerced to make certain 
choices by virtue of their poverty. The remedy for unjust distributions, 
and for that form of coercion, is to give people more resources, not to 
require people to buy goods on terms that they ªnd unacceptable. Sup-
pose that people are willing to pay only $60 to buy a health care plan be-
cause they are not rich, and that if they had double their current wealth, 
they would be willing to pay $120. Even if this is so, government does 
them no favors by forcing them to pay the amount that they would pay if 
they had more money. 
II.  Who’s Paying? Why Inefªcient Results May 
Increase Welfare 
A.  The Basic Problem 
Sometimes the simple model, and the core cases, do not describe re-
ality. Most important, people do not always pay all or even most of the 
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cost of what they receive. Sometimes those involved in making law have 
a great deal of control over whether and how much people must pay for 
those beneªts. Perhaps Jenkins, in case three above, can be given an ac-
commodation without having to pay a penny for it. Perhaps lawmakers can 
take steps to ensure that the potential beneªciaries pay little or nothing, 
or that much of the underlying payment comes from those who have the 
relevant good or impose the relevant burdens and risks. When this is so, 
the welfare analysis is much more complicated. An emphasis on WTP 
may therefore point in the wrong directions. 
The disability context is an obvious example. Disabled workers do 
not pay for the “reasonable accommodations” required by the statute; but 
as in Jenkins’ case, the WTP of those workers may be low in comparison 
to the monetized costs. Nonetheless, the accommodations may greatly 
improve net welfare.14 Suppose, for example, that a wheelchair-bound per-
son is willing to pay only $100 for an accommodation, such as lowering 
a sink, and that the accommodation would cost an employer $200. The 
accommodation is inefªcient by stipulation; the monetized cost is $100 
greater than the monetized beneªt. But it is entirely possible that the ag-
gregate welfare effects will be positive even though the accommodation 
is inefªcient. In terms of welfare, the worker might well gain more than 
the employer loses. It follows that if courts and regulators use WTP to assess 
costs and beneªts under the reasonable accommodation requirement of 
the ADA, they will fail to call for accommodations that would greatly im-
prove overall welfare. 
Air pollution regulation is another illustration. In California, poor 
people and members of minority communities have been net gainers from 
air pollution regulation, and they have not had to pay the full price of 
what they have obtained.15 Much of the cost of air pollution reduction has 
been imposed on those buying new cars. In fact, new car purchasers have 
been “paying heavily,” between $1,000 and $2,000, for pollution-reducing 
equipment.16 The conclusion is that the costs of air pollution regulation 
are borne mostly by people who are wealthy or of moderate means; such 
people pay “emissions penalties that many of the poor are avoiding.”17 
By contrast, the greatest improvements in air quality have been ex-
perienced in the poorest neighborhoods. In 1980, those who lived in wealth-
ier areas faced 25% less nitrogen dioxide than those in poorer areas. By 
1998, however, exposure levels were essentially equalized.18 This equal-
ity was not produced by increased pollution in wealthier areas. On the 
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contrary, signiªcant reductions could be found everywhere. But the larger 
reductions were found in the poorest neighborhoods, formerly suffering 
from especially high pollution levels.19 
The disability and air pollution examples suggest the possibility that 
poor people are gaining more, in terms of welfare, than wealthy people 
are losing, even if a standard economic inquiry into WTP suggests that the 
relevant regulations are inefªcient and therefore unjustiªed. It follows 
that if we attend to people’s WTP, we might end up with an inadequate 
account of the welfare effects of air pollution regulation. People might well 
be gaining more than they lose, even if the monetized costs appear higher 
than the monetized beneªts. Of course the account thus far does not es-
tablish that point for air pollution regulation in California. But it is cer-
tainly plausible to think that whatever the WTP of those who beneªted from 
air pollution reduction, the welfare gains (longer lives and better health) 
justiªed the welfare costs. 
To make these claims less abstract: Suppose that the beneªciaries of 
a proposed drinking water regulation are willing to pay only $20 to elimi-
nate a risk of one in 50,000 in drinking water; that the per-person cost of 
eliminating a one in 50,000 risk is $50; but that for every dollar of that cost, 
the beneªciaries pay only ten cents. Suppose that the remaining ninety cents 
will be paid by water companies themselves, in the form of reduced proªts, 
or by employees of the water companies, in the form of reduced wages. 
In this example, the regulation is inefªcient, because the costs of the regula-
tion exceed the beneªts. But in principle, the regulation might well be 
justiªed on welfarist grounds. After all, the beneªciaries of the regulation 
are being helped a great deal, and their WTP does not tell regulators what 
they need to know in terms of the welfare effects. 
We need to make a distinction here between WTP and ability to pay. 
If people do not have much money, they will have little ability to pay. 
When poor people show a low WTP, it may be because their ability to pay is 
low. But their low WTP does not demonstrate that they would gain little 
in terms of welfare from receiving the relevant good. Consider cases two 
and three above, in which Smith is willing to pay little for a television 
that he would much enjoy, and in which Jenkins is willing to pay little for a 
workplace accommodation from which he would greatly beneªt. 
The central problem is that WTP is measuring gains and losses in 
monetary terms, rather than in welfare terms. The WTP ªgures do not tell 
us whether some people are gaining more, in welfare terms, than others are 
losing in those terms.20 In the water pollution example given above, over-
all welfare might be increased, not diminished. Or imagine that a reduc-
tion in greenhouse gases greatly diminishes risks faced by people in de-
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veloping nations, above all in India and Africa, which are especially vul-
nerable to climate change.21 Imagine too that such people are unable and 
hence unwilling to pay a great deal for protection from such risks. Imag-
ine ªnally that the cost of the regulation is borne by people in wealthy 
nations, above all the United States and Europe, and that this cost is higher 
than the monetized beneªts to people in developing countries. Even un-
der these assumptions, the regulation might well produce large overall wel-
fare gains. If people in developing countries are able to have much longer 
and healthier lives, they might well be gaining far more than people lose 
in United States and Europe, even if energy bills are higher, automobile 
use is more expensive, and wages and employment are reduced. 
Of course distributional effects might also be relevant. Suppose that 
in terms of overall welfare, the regulation in question is not desirable; it 
reduces aggregate welfare. But suppose too that those who beneªt from the 
regulation are poorer and more disadvantaged than those who lose. If those 
who beneªt are disproportionately poor, and those who lose are dispropor-
tionately wealthy, the regulation might still be desirable despite the wel-
fare loss. We might care more about those at the bottom and seek to im-
prove their prospects even if those at the top lose more in welfare terms 
than those at the bottom gain. My emphasis here, however, is on the pos-
sibility that there might be welfare gains from policies that are inefªcient, 
not that policies might be justiªed even if there are welfare losses. 
The simple conclusion is that the argument for using WTP is most 
plausible in cases in which the beneªciaries of some government action 
pay all or most of its cost. In such cases, WTP is reasonably used so long 
as people are adequately informed and not suffering from any kind of 
cognitive problem.22 The analysis must be different when the beneªciaries 
of regulation are paying only a small fraction of its costs. Unfortunately, that 
analysis is difªcult to conduct: regulators lack “welfarometers” that can 
tell them about the welfare effects of various courses of action.23 But as we 
shall see, it is possible to devise some simple rules of thumb that help to 
show when WTP is likely to lead in the wrong direction. 
B. Cross-National  Valuations 
This point can be supported, clariªed, and applied through an explo-
ration of cross-cultural variations in WTP. It should be clear that simply 
because they have little money, people in poor nations will show a lower 
WTP for various goods than people in wealthy nations. The disparity is 
not necessarily a product of differences in expected welfare from obtain-
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ing those goods. For example, those who show a WTP of $10 to obtain a 
new television might receive more welfare from the television than others 
who show a WTP of $750. The difference in WTP is not accompanied by 
a difference in welfare. If poor people show a WTP of only $20 to obtain 
medicine that will prevent premature death, it does not follow that they 
receive less welfare from their lives than wealthy people who show a 
WTP of $100,000 to obtain the same medicine. 
Consider in this regard the value of a statistical life (VSL), which is 
compiled by attempting to ascertain how much people would be willing 
to pay to avoid some statistical risk. Not surprisingly, studies ªnd that 
across nations WTP and VSL are highly variable. For example, VSL is as 
low as $200,000 for Taiwan, $800,000 for South Korea, and $1 million for 
India, but as high as $19 million for Australia.
24 Consider, for purposes of 
illustration, the following table:
25 
Table 1: VSL across Nations  
Nation and Year of Study  VSL (in 2000 US$) 
Taiwan (1997)  .2 –.9 million 
South Korea (1993)  .8 million 
India (1996/97)  1.2–1.5 million 
Hong Kong (1998)  1.7 million 
Canada (1989)  3.9–4.7 million 
Switzerland (2001) 6.3–8.6  million 
Japan (1991)  9.7 million 
Australia (1997)  11.3–19.1 million 
United Kingdom (2000)  19.9 million 
 
Because poor people have less money than rich people, the ªgures in 
this table should not be terribly surprising. Suppose that we can antici-
pate that in a particular period, there will be 100,000 deaths worldwide 
from climate change—deaths that include (let us make up some numbers) 
95,000 people from poor countries and 5000 people from wealthy ones. 
Should we say that the former deaths are worth much less attention than 
the latter? Building on evidence of cross-national disparities, some assess-
ments of the effects of climate change do ªnd far higher monetized costs 
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from deaths of people in rich countries than from deaths of people in 
poor countries.
26 
From the standpoint of welfare, that conclusion makes no sense at 
all. The fact that a poor person in a poor nation would be willing to pay 
only $1 to eliminate a risk of one in 10,000, whereas a wealthy person in 
a wealthy nation would be willing to pay $100, cannot plausibly be used 
to defend the view that in terms of welfare, the latter loss is worse. To 
illustrate this point, imagine choosing between two programs: 
Program A would eliminate (at a cost of $600) a one in 10,000 risk 
faced by ªfty poor people in India, each willing to pay $20 to eliminate 
that risk. 
Program B would eliminate (also at a cost of $600) a one in 10,000 
risk faced by ªfty wealthy people in France, each willing to pay $350 to 
eliminate that same risk. 
There is no reason to think that Program A would have a lesser effect 
on welfare, even though the French WTP is far higher than that of the Indi-
ans. 
But now consider a different issue. What VSL should the Indian gov-
ernment use when deciding on the appropriate policy to reduce workplace 
risks? Such a government would not do well to use the WTP of citizens of 
France.27 If citizens in a poor nation reveal a WTP of $20 to eliminate risks 
of 1/10,000, then their government does them no favors by requiring them to 
pay $100 or $50 for that protection. This is the sense in which VSL prop-
erly varies across nations, and in which citizens of poor nations have 
lower VSLs than citizens of wealthy ones. If the government of India uses 
the American VSL of $6 million on the theory that its citizens should not 
be valued less than those of wealthy nations, signiªcant harm to the citi-
zens of India will almost inevitably result. 
In the core or deªning cases, nothing said thus far argues against the 
use of WTP.28 Outside of those cases, the issue is more complicated. In 
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India, as elsewhere, it is possible that the beneªciaries will pay for only a 
fraction of the cost of what they get, and that the losers will lose less, in 
welfare terms, than the gainers will gain in those terms. Nonetheless, it is 
entirely sensible for the government of India to spend far less on reduc-
ing certain risks (of, say, one in 100,000) than the governments of France 
and the United States. The Indian government does not spend far less on 
the ground that Indian lives are “worth less” than French or American 
lives. It does so instead on the ground that it is concerned with the wel-
fare of its citizens, and using a French or American VSL will reduce the 
welfare of its citizens. But it remains true that if welfare is our guide, 
serious risks faced by people in poor nations deserve special priority and 
the WTP of those people is a poor proxy for welfare. 
C.  Law and Policy 
1. Taxes  vs.  Regulation 
At the domestic level, there is a standard response to arguments of 
this sort: redistributive taxation should be preferred to regulation. For 
example, suppose that poor people are willing to pay relatively little for 
air pollution controls and that wealthy people strongly resist the cost of 
such controls. Suppose too that even though such controls are therefore un-
justiªed on efªciency grounds, they might be justiªed on grounds of wel-
fare. If so, the best approach is not to impose the controls, but to redis-
tribute resources to poor people. Redistributive taxes are the more effec-
tive and more efªcient method for achieving welfare goals. 
Before examining this claim, note that there is a larger background 
point here: if a marginal dollar is worth more to poor people than to wealthy 
people, then there is a strong argument for signiªcant redistribution on 
welfare grounds, all other things being equal.29 If the goal is to increase 
welfare, a large amount of redistribution would seem to be mandatory even 
if equality as such is unimportant. An evident problem is that redistribu-
tion might remove desirable incentives and thereby decrease welfare.30 
But this problem should not be taken as decisive against redistribution; it 
raises an empirical challenge, which is to design the optimal redistribu-
tive strategy, taking incentives into account. 
The broader point is correct. The best response to the problem I have 
identiªed is redistributive taxation.31 Unfortunately, the political system of-
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ten blocks such taxation, and it does so even if it authorizes law and pol-
icy that promotes welfare less efªciently. We need not pause to consider 
why this might be so. The simple point is that realistically speaking, the 
choice is often between some status quo and a policy that is both inefªcient 
and welfare-increasing. The choice should be made in favor of welfare, not 
efªciency. This choice is even easier in the international context. While it 
might be impossible to redistribute from wealthy nations to poor ones (be-
cause no mechanism is available to produce such redistribution), it might 
nonetheless be possible to obtain an international accord that is both inefª-
cient and welfare-increasing. 
2. Administering  Welfare: A Challenge for the Ofªce of Information 
and Regulatory Affairs (and Others) 
Difªcult administrative issues do remain. For example, suppose that 
a proposed law is expected to eliminate 100 premature deaths, stemming 
from risks of one in 100,000, at a cost of $800 million; suppose too that 
the median population-wide WTP, for risks of one in 100,000, is $60, 
indicating a VSL of $6 million. At ªrst glance, the law is inefªcient. The 
analysis is straightforward if the case arises in Paretoville and if the problem 
falls within the core or deªning cases. But if it does not, planners must 
investigate the incidence of the relevant beneªts and burdens. If the 
$800 million cost is borne mostly by wealthy people, the policy might 
well be welfare-increasing even though it is inefªcient. It is now stan-
dard, in the regulatory domain, to investigate whether the beneªciaries of 
regulation are disproportionately poor.32 But even if we learn that they 
are, we do not know enough to know whether regulation is desirable. Per-
haps the beneªciaries are poor, but perhaps they will bear most of the 
cost as well; perhaps this is Paretoville after all. And even if the beneª-
ciaries are not poor, the regulation might be welfare-increasing if those 
who pay are mostly rich. An investigation of the incidence of both 
beneªts and costs will provide relevant information on whether regula-
tion will promote welfare even if it is inefªcient. 
The Ofªce of Information and Regulatory Affairs, entrusted with 
managing executive orders calling for cost-beneªt analysis of regulatory 
proposals, would do well to pay attention to this problem. As a ªrst ap-
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proximation, it is not at all implausible to endorse cost-beneªt analysis 
on the ground that it is a rough proxy for welfare.33 But where the proxy 
fails, the analysis must be qualiªed. Where does the proxy fail? For pur-
poses of policy there is a simple answer. If the beneªciaries are poor, and 
if the costs are borne by those who are wealthy, the outcome of a cost-bene-
ªt analysis based on WTP should not be determinative. If the beneªciaries 
stand to gain a great deal in welfare terms, and those who pay are unlikely 
to lose much in those terms, the policy should be adopted. Unfortunately, 
there is no simple metric by which to quantify the welfare judgments. But at 
least in some cases, the conclusion will be easy enough to reach. Consider, 
for example, an air pollution regulation that disproportionately beneªts 
poor people and for which wealthy people must pay. 
III. What  Is  Welfare? 
The argument thus far has said nothing about what is meant by the 
idea of “welfare.” The basic idea might be speciªed in many different 
ways.34 Most economists understand welfare by reference to people’s 
subjective preferences—as, for example, in the idea that X will promote 
A’s welfare more than Y if and to the extent that A prefers X over Y.35 For 
those who rely on subjective preferences, it is important to try to ensure 
that A has adequate information; if the watch for which A is willing to 
pay $75 is likely to work for only one month, A should be apprised of 
that fact. The simple point is that the idea of welfare might be measured 
by asking what A prefers. 
Note that A’s preference might have little to do with narrowly self-
interested desires on A’s part. A might prefer to give $75 to charity, rather 
than to keep it; A might prefer to do considerable work on behalf of a fa-
vored cause, even though the work is not enjoyable. A’s preferences might 
not promote A’s welfare, narrowly conceived, if A prefers to take actions 
that do not promote his welfare, narrowly conceived.36 The standard eco-
nomic emphasis on people’s subjective preferences has the considerable 
advantage of attending to what people care about, whether or not their 
concerns are always connected with their own happiness or self-interest, 
narrowly conceived. 
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A. Objective  Welfare? 
Economists typically speak in terms of people’s subjective experience.37 
But it is possible to understand the notion of welfare in more objective 
terms. On this view, the right question is whether people’s lives are good, 
not whether they think that their lives are good (even though their thoughts 
are highly relevant in this regard). For example, suppose that A’s life con-
sists mostly of accumulating campaign buttons, Chicago White Sox memo-
rabilia, or money. Suppose that A spends most of his waking hours trying 
to acquire as much as he possibly can. It is plausible to think that A’s life, 
objectively understood, is not a good one, and that A’s welfare, properly 
understood, would be higher if his life were not so dedicated. 
In an extreme case, A might suffer from some kind of mental disabil-
ity which leads him to be obsessed and miserable. A chooses patterns that 
make his life miserable and he badly needs help. In this case, it is not 
enough, indeed it is hopeless and cruel, simply to allow A to satisfy his 
preferences. More optimistically, he might actually enjoy his efforts at ac-
cumulation, but his life is narrow, repetitive, compulsive, and without much 
meaning, even by his own lights. 
In any case, we might believe that whether A’s life is good depends 
(partly) on what it includes and not (entirely) on what A thinks, independent 
of the circumstances under which A has developed those thoughts. Amar-
tya Sen and Martha Nussbaum have elaborated a “capabilities approach” 
to human development, one that might be seen as welfarist insofar as it 
attempts to specify some capabilities that are taken to be indispensable 
preconditions for a good life.38 The capabilities approach begins with an 
objective account of what people should be able to do and to be; if peo-
ple lack the relevant capabilities, they might be taken to lack the precon-
ditions for welfare or well-being.39 Both Sen and Nussbaum also refer to 
“functionings,” understood to capture what people actually end up doing 
given the basic capabilities. The idea of functionings might also be used 
as the basis for a welfarist account.40 John Finnis has worked in a broadly 
similar vein.41 
If welfare is understood to have an objective component, it should be 
unsurprising that people’s choices, and their WTP, do not always promote 
their welfare. If people suffer from capability failure, their deprivation 
may not enable them to make welfare-promoting choices. Raised under 
conditions of inequality, women may not want signiªcant changes in their 
situations, only because the underlying conditions have made those changes 
unimaginable. Similarly, people raised under circumstances of poor health 
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may not be willing to pay much to improve their health, for they lack the 
resources or information to understand what better health could actually 
mean or entail. Raised without clean air or clean water, or beautiful areas, 
people might not be willing to pay much to improve air or water quality 
or to preserve or increase the number of beautiful areas. 
Perhaps the problem here is a lack of information; perhaps preferences 
have adapted to a lack of anything better.42 In either case, we do not promote 
welfare, or for that matter freedom, if we simply honor people’s WTP. And 
while these problems are especially acute in poor nations, it would be most 
surprising if they could not be found in wealthy nations as well. 
B. Measuring  Subjective  Welfare? 
An objective account of welfare raises many questions, and it might 
be best to proceed by investigating the relationship between WTP and wel-
fare in more subjective terms. Economists tend to think that if people are 
willing to pay $75 for a watch, they prefer the watch to $75. But it should be 
clear at the outset that the idea of “preference” has a serious ambiguity. 
Do we mean to measure A’s preference at the time of choice, or at the time 
of experience? 
Suppose that A chooses the watch over $75, but that after two days, 
concludes that the watch is ugly, that he made a stupid decision, and that 
he would turn back time and undo the transaction if he could. Suppose that 
A actually hates his watch and is made miserable by it. If so, A’s choice 
has not promoted A’s welfare by A’s own lights. If we emphasize A’s sub-
jective well-being, we might think that his choices are no more than a proxy 
for his welfare, rightly speciªed. Recall here Wilson’s case above; Wilson 
is willing to spend a great deal for a summer home that she would not enjoy. 
Or consider the case of Andrews, who is not willing to pay much for a 
health plan from which she would greatly beneªt. The general question is 
whether welfare might be measured directly. 
1.  Happiness in General 
Inspired by this question, many social scientists are attempting to 
measure welfare by exploring how happy people are, either in general or 
in response to particular choices and events.43 The apparent and admit-
tedly inadequate premise is that happiness and welfare are identical.44 For 
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the moment, let us take that premise as a deªnition rather than an argu-
ment; certainly happiness is at least an ingredient in welfare. If the goal 
is to measure happiness, we might do so by asking people or instead by at-
tempting to measure hedonic states in various ways.45 
a.  The Puzzling Disconnect Between Economic Growth and 
Happiness Measures 
An evident puzzle is that increases in economic growth are not cor-
related with increases in reported life-satisfaction. Consider Figure 1. 
Figure 1 [2 in original]: Life Satisfaction and Income per Capita 
in Japan46 
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The pattern shown here turns out to be typical. The United States, 
France, and Japan all experienced dramatic increases in real income in 
the twentieth century, but showed no increase in subjective well-being.47 
An especially striking ªnding involves China.48 Between 1994 and 2005, 
China experienced explosive growth of 250% in average real income. In 
that same period, life satisfaction in China actually declined, with a re-
duction in reported “satisfaction” from approximately 80% to 70% and 
an increase in reported “dissatisfaction” from approximately 21% to 35%.49 
Hence it is not easy to establish any kind of correlation between eco-
nomic growth and increases in subjective welfare. 
For purposes of self-reported happiness, what appears to matter is rela-
tive economic position, not absolute economic position.50 People’s self-
reported happiness is greatly affected by their position in the economic 
hierarchy rather than by their absolute wealth. By itself, this ªnding does 
not demonstrate that WTP is a poor proxy for welfare. But it does raise 
serious problems about any effort to identify WTP with welfare: even if 
wealth is maximized, in the sense that society’s aggregated WTP is very 
high and getting higher, people’s life-satisfaction may not be better. From 
existing evidence, it is odd but not implausible to say that if the GDP of 
America or France doubled in some period of years, we would not pick 
up any increase in people’s life-satisfaction. (Return to the case of China.) If 
welfare is our lodestar, this possibility raises serious concerns for those 
who believe that economic growth is the best way to increase national well-
being. 
Of course self-reported happiness is not the only thing that is impor-
tant, even if welfare is our lodestar. It is possible to question self-reported 
happiness on the ground that it may not adequately measure subjective 
happiness; perhaps self-reports invite relative rather than absolute assess-
ments.51 If this is so, people in China might report declining satisfaction 
after a period of explosive economic growth, not because they are less 
happy in absolute terms than they were before, but because they see that 
they are less happy, relatively speaking, than they were before. Even if those 
reports do measure subjective happiness, perhaps subjective happiness 
should not be our guide. Happiness may not increase with growth in GDP, 
but one result of GDP growth may well be increases in longevity, health, 
and opportunity.52 From the standpoint of increasing human welfare, it is 
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better to enable people to live eighty healthy years than ªfty less healthy 
years, even if the level of daily happiness does not increase. If increases 
in GDP are correlated with longer and healthier lives, and with better oppor-
tunities and greater education, such increases appear to increase welfare 
even if subjective happiness stays constant. 
But if the goal really is welfare, we might pursue longevity, health, 
opportunity, education, and subjective happiness directly and focus on eco-
nomic growth only to the extent that it is responsible or a good proxy for 
such improvements. If the data on subjective happiness is taken seriously, 
the consequences for law and policy would appear to be signiªcant, because 
economic growth would be demoted to a secondary goal, to be promoted 
only to the extent that it helps achieve primary goals, which might in any 
case be pursued directly.53 
b. Measuring  Experience 
There are major problems with relying on reported life-satisfaction 
as a measure of welfare. Perhaps people report high life-satisfaction even 
though their daily lives are not especially good54; perhaps they report low 
life-satisfaction even though from moment-to-moment, their welfare is high. 
Daniel Kahneman and his coauthors have attempted to learn more about 
welfare by seeing how much people enjoy various activities.55 They ªnd 
that some voluntary choices produce high levels of self-reported happi-
ness, but that other voluntary choices do not. Here is a summary of their 
preliminary ªndings: 
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Findings of this kind present many puzzles. Evidently people do not 
much like interacting with their co-workers and bosses, at least not com-
pared to interacting with their friends and relatives; but work-related in-
teractions may be worthwhile on balance, because people are paid for those 
interactions. From this evidence, then, we cannot conclude that people’s 
choices, or their WTP, do not promote their welfare. But the evidence at 
least suggests the possibility that people are choosing to engage in be-
havior that they do not enjoy or that might fail to improve their welfare. 
If it were possible to measure the relationship between particular 
choices and particular experiences directly, we would have a test of wel-
fare that might actually be used to assess the effects of law and policy. Here 
the mismatch would not merely be between WTP and welfare; it would be 
between choices and welfare. The result of such a mismatch would be more 
ambitious than anything I have discussed thus far. Perhaps the goal should 
be to ªnd national “happiness accounts” or “welfare accounts,” exploring 
subjective well-being at the aggregate level.56 If such explorations are feasi-
ble, an emphasis might be made not on GDP, but on changes in aggregate 
happiness or self-reported welfare over time. Such an emphasis might signi-
ªcantly alter national priorities. We might see, for example, that efforts to 
reduce mental illness would have a signiªcant impact on aggregate happi-
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ness or self-reported life-satisfaction—a far more signiªcant impact than 
general efforts to promote economic growth.57 
IV.  Errors in Affective Forecasting 
Focusing more narrowly on particular welfare-reducing choices, a 
growing literature investigates the problem of “miswanting,” which arises 
from failures of “affective forecasting.”58 A decision about what to do, or 
what to acquire, requires people to make judgments about the welfare effects 
of an action or an acquisition. As in the cases of Wilson and Andrews above, 
we now know enough to say that these judgments may go badly wrong. 
Let us see exactly why, and then turn to implications for law and policy. 
A. Projection  Bias 
People’s current emotional states often have a large impact on their 
affective forecasts in a way that can produce signiªcant errors. A simple 
demonstration, involving consumption choices. is that shoppers at grocery 
stores are greatly inºuenced by how hungry they are at the time that they 
shop.59 They fail to adjust for the fact that in the next week, they are unlikely 
to be hungry most of the time.60 In the same vein, catalogue shoppers who 
place orders via telephone are greatly inºuenced by the weather condi-
tions at that time and hence make choices that they later regret.61 When 
people buy warm clothes on especially chilly days, they are more likely to 
return those clothes.62 This distortion has been labeled “projection bias,” 
meaning that people wrongly project their current emotional state onto 
their future selves.63 
As Kahneman and Thaler suggest, a related problem can arise when 
people join sports clubs with the mistaken belief that they will visit the 
club often. Evidently many people greatly overestimate their likely use of 
such clubs.64 Those who make such overestimates are not necessarily in a 
“hot” state, but they are projecting their current desire for more exercise 
into the later state, when they might well want to stay home and relax. The 
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problem with projection bias is that it suggests that people will make 
choices that do not promote their welfare,65 as when they end up with prod-
ucts that they do not enjoy when they are using or consuming them. 
Projection bias is closely related to what has been called the “hot/cold 
empathy gap.”66 When people are in “hot” emotional states, they tend to 
err in anticipating their future emotional states; when they are in “cold” 
states, they blunder with respect to what they will want when they are “hot-
ter.”67 Here is a simple demonstration. Visitors to a museum were asked to 
take a short trivia quiz and instructed to select one of two possible forms 
of compensation: answers to the quiz or a candy bar. When people were 
asked to make the choice before taking the quiz, they generally chose the 
candy bar. When people were asked to choose after taking the quiz, and 
hence were in a “hot” state in terms of their curiosity, they generally 
chose the answers.68 It is reasonable to think that when people are in a “hot” 
state, they may take risks that they would not otherwise take, in a way that 
might lead to overall welfare losses. Consider unsafe driving, excessive 
drinking, and risky sexual activity. 
Of course, it is not clear how or whether public ofªcials should react 
to the possibility of projection bias. My major point is that people might 
be willing to pay for goods that will not promote their welfare—and that 
they might not be willing to pay for goods that will promote their welfare. 
For this reason, use of WTP, at the time of choice, may well lead to wel-
fare losses. 
B. Unrealistic  Optimism 
Many people suffer from excessive optimism.69 With respect to most 
of the risks faced in ordinary life, people show a tendency to be unrealis-
tically optimistic.70 The most well-documented ªndings of optimism involve 
relative (as opposed to absolute) risk. About 90% of drivers think that 
they are safer than the average driver and less likely to be involved in a seri-
ous accident.71 People generally think that they are less likely than other 
people to be divorced, to have heart disease, to be ªred from a job, and much 
more.72 At ªrst glance, a belief in relative immunity from risk seems dis-
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turbing. But by itself, this ªnding does not establish that people underes-
timate the risks that they actually face. Perhaps people have an accurate 
understanding of their own statistical risks even if they say and believe, 
wrongly, that other people are more vulnerable than they are.73 
But there is also evidence of unrealistic optimism for absolute risks. For 
example, professional ªnancial experts consistently overestimate likely 
earnings, and business school students overestimate their likely starting 
salaries and the number of offers that they will receive.74 People also un-
derestimate their likelihood of being involved in a serious automobile 
accident,75 and their failure to buy ºood and earthquake insurance is at least 
consistent with the view that people are excessively optimistic.76 It is rea-
sonable to extrapolate that when risk-related behavior is involved, people’s 
WTP may be distorted by excessive optimism. To that extent, it may poorly 
reºect the welfare effects of various courses of action. 
Here as well, the appropriate legal response is not clear. But at the very 
least, informational strategies, designed to reduce or to eliminate the bias, 
would seem justiªed from the welfarist point of view.77 
C. Myopia 
Some people are myopic, emphasizing the short-term at the expense 
of the future.78 Consider the case of Andrews, who refuses to purchase 
health insurance that would make her life go better. Myopic behavior might 
be seen as a taste for current well-being over future well-being, in a way 
that raises no concerns about welfare losses or bounded rationality. But if 
a day’s welfare gains are purchased at the expense of long-term distress, 
bounded rationality is probably involved. Myopia helps to account for 
self-control problems, leading consumers to make decisions that undermine 
their well-being over time. Consider here the problems associated with 
insufªcient exercise, obesity, poor diet, and excessive smoking and drinking. 
A distinctive form of bounded rationality stems from neglect of the aggre-
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gate effect of a large number of relatively small borrowing choices. 79 Call 
this “cumulative cost neglect.” Addictive behavior is the most serious prob-
lem here, but “cumulative cost neglect” can be a problem even when addic-
tion is not involved. 
When behavior is myopic, WTP will not adequately capture the wel-
fare effects of choices. People may be willing to pay signiªcant amounts 
for goods and for courses of action that do not, on balance, make their lives 
go better. If welfare is the goal, WTP is a poor guide. 
D.  The Focusing Illusion and Immune Neglect 
Individual welfare is a component of many variables. If people are de-
pressed, anxious, or experiencing some kind of mental illness, their sub-
jective welfare will be low by deªnition.80 But there is a much broader prob-
lem. With respect to subjective happiness, individual choices may go wrong 
if they depend on a mistaken judgment about the importance of a particu-
lar choice to overall well-being. Daniel Kahneman and David Schkade have 
described the problem in a wonderful maxim: “Nothing in life matters 
quite as much as you think it does while you are thinking about it.”81 The 
general point here is that when focusing on a particular aspect of life, or 
a particular ingredient of welfare, people may make serious blunders. 
Consider a simple demonstration. Most people appear to believe that 
they would be happier in California.82 This belief is held by Californians 
as well as people who do not live in California. But in fact, those who 
live in California are not happier than those who live elsewhere. Appar-
ently they are subject to a “focusing illusion.”83 Focusing on the idea of Cali-
fornia, and on California’s weather in particular, causes people to believe 
that they would be happier in California. This belief is held even though 
weather is not an important determinant of most people’s happiness. 
Focusing illusions can be found in many domains. In particular, people 
fail to consider the power of psychological mechanisms that immunize 
them from the kinds of hedonic losses that they expect to face in the event 
that things go wrong. Consider some examples: 
1.  Assistant professors greatly overstate the effect of the tenure deci-
sion on their subjective happiness.84 They expect that this decision will 
affect their happiness for many years, and in part for that reason, greatly 
want to be tenured. But after a few years have passed, those who are ten-
ured are no happier than those who were denied tenure. 
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2. Voters believe that the outcome of an election will greatly affect 
their happiness a month after the election. But in that month, losers and 
winners are as happy as they were before the election.85 
3. College students predicted that their happiness would be affected 
more by the physical features of their dormitories than by the quality of 
their social life. In fact, the opposite was true: physical features had es-
sentially no impact on their happiness.86 
4. People think that a year after winning the lottery, the winners are 
likely to be much happier than they were before they won the lottery. But 
after a year has passed, lottery winners are about as happy as they were 
before.87 
5. People expect that paraplegics will show much lower happi-
ness levels than people who are able-bodied. In fact, their happiness lev-
els are lower, but not dramatically so.88 
6.  People in the midst of a divorce believe that they will be very un-
happy ªfteen months after their divorce. In fact, their happiness levels 
are about the same.89 
7. Major life events, such as bereavement and marriage, are ex-
pected to have signiªcant long-term consequences for subjective happi-
ness, but the consequences are temporary.90 
There appear to be several problems here. One is that people show 
“immune neglect;” they do not see the power of their internal psychological 
immune system, which greatly diminishes the welfare effects of apparently 
signiªcant changes. Another problem is that people demonstrate a kind of 
“impact bias,”91 in the form of a tendency to exaggerate the effect of fu-
ture events on their own emotional states. People have been found to overes-
timate the welfare effects of personal insults, sports events, romantic break-
ups, electoral defeats, and much more.92 The overestimates appear to be a 
product of “duration bias,” understood as an exaggeration of the length of 
time during which both desirable and undesirable effects will have an emo-
tional impact.93 “The conclusion from this body of research is that people 
are systematically wrong in their expectations about the life circumstances 
that will increase or decrease their happiness, which in turn implies that 
life choices that people make in their pursuit of happiness are also likely 
to be wrong.”94 
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It is not yet clear how the focusing illusion and related phenomena 
might be enlisted to measure the welfare effects of various courses of 
action. But it is clear that insofar as people’s WTP is a product of such 
phenomena, it will lead people in directions that are not welfare-promoting, 
and that may even be harmful to their interests. 
For the legal system, there is a more concrete implication. Juries and 
others may also suffer from projection bias and may greatly exaggerate the 
hedonic effects of some losses. For example, suppose that a plaintiff has lost 
two ªngers and the jury is asked to monetize the loss, including the asso-
ciated pain and suffering. Because of the power of the psychological im-
mune system, it is not implausible to think that the loss is short-term and 
relatively small. After a period of adjustment, those who lose two ªngers, 
or even an arm, may be only trivially worse off than those who have suffered 
no such loss. Juries are unlikely to see the adaptation and are likely to 
suffer from a focusing illusion akin to those asked whether they would be 
happier if they lived in California. It is a worthwhile question whether in 
the award of damages, the legal system might be showing a systematic bias 
as a result.95 
E.  Problems, Puzzles, and Libertarian Paternalism 
Suppose that people’s choices often go wrong, for reasons of the sort 
that I have elaborated. It remains true that freedom of choice should be 
counted as both an intrinsic and an instrumental good. Perhaps people ought 
to be permitted to choose as they like, because it is an insult to their 
autonomy to deny them the right to choose, even if their choices do not 
promote their welfare. Perhaps freedom of choice should be respected be-
cause it is an ingredient in welfare, in the sense that people feel frustrated 
or worse if their choices are not honored. An understanding of failures in 
affective forecasting might not justify error-prone ofªcials, themselves sub-
ject to similar errors, in foreclosing choices on welfare grounds. Indeed, 
public errors in affective forecasting would be far more damaging than 
private ones, if only because they affect so many people at the same time 
and are less readily subject to self-correction.96 
In these circumstances, the best response to the problem sketched 
above might well be a form of “libertarian paternalism,” an approach that 
does not compromise freedom of choice, but that steers decisions in wel-
fare-promoting directions.97 For libertarian paternalists, it is generally im-
portant to allow people to go their own way, even if social planners be-
lieve that their welfare is likely to be jeopardized. The planners may be 
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wrong, and even if they are right, freedom of choice should ordinarily be 
respected. But libertarian paternalists also believe that default rules, in-
formation, and debiasing strategies98 are properly used to increase the 
chances that people will choose well. Such strategies might well be enlisted 
when planners have good evidence that affective forecasting errors are 
likely to occur and to produce real harm. 
A defense of libertarian paternalism is well beyond the scope of the 
present discussion.99 My major claim is theoretical rather than program-
matic: If welfare is the goal, WTP will sometimes not be the means, be-
cause affective forecasting is not always reliable. Those who emphasize 
WTP, and unconstrained freedom of choice, might well be producing wel-
fare losses. 
V. Conclusion 
In certain cases, the relationship between WTP and welfare ought to 
be close. When people pay for all (or almost all) of the costs of a good that 
they are receiving, and when adequate information is available, it makes 
sense to use WTP. The analysis is far more complicated when the beneªci-
aries are paying little or nothing for what they are receiving. If the beneª-
ciaries are poor, and if those who pay are wealthy, the program may be 
welfare-promoting even if it is inefªcient. We have seen that in the con-
text of disability and air pollution policy, the inefªcient solution might 
well promote welfare. 
To be sure, the tax system is usually the best means of redistributing 
wealth. But sometimes the tax system is unavailable, and when the only 
options are inaction and inefªcient regulation, the latter is sometimes 
best if the goal is to promote welfare. One implication is that it is not 
enough to ask for government agencies to examine whether the beneªciaries 
of regulation are poor. It is also necessary to examine the wealth or pov-
erty of those who pay for regulation. If cost-beneªt analysis based on WTP 
is used as the basis for law and policy, it might well block measures that 
would promote welfare—and fail to promote measures that would produce 
signiªcant welfare gains. We have seen examples in the context of air pollu-
tion regulation and climate change. 
A much more fundamental point is that people’s choices, and their 
WTP, may lead them to make decisions that do not promote their welfare. 
Remarkably, increases in GDP do not produce increases in people’s self-
reported life satisfaction—a ªnding that raises the possibility that eco-
nomic growth does far less good than is customarily believed. In addi-
tion, affective forecasting is error-prone. As a result of projection bias, peo-
ple do not see that their current emotional state can be a crude proxy for 
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their future emotional state, and hence they make choices that they will 
later come to regret. As a result of unrealistic optimism, people take risks 
when an objective analysis of their own welfare suggests that they ought not 
to do so. As a result of myopia, people make decisions that produce long-
term or aggregate harm. As a result of focusing illusions, people exaggerate 
the aggregate impact of speciªc changes on their welfare. WTP is often 
based on an affective forecast, and sometimes the forecast will be badly 
wrong. 
Much work remains to be done to establish the appropriate response, 
if any, to these problems in terms of law and policy. At a minimum, I have 
suggested that there are serious problems with the emphasis on economic 
growth as the measure of social welfare; that an emphasis on the actual 
ingredients of welfare might be feasible as well as better; and that jury 
awards for hedonic damages might well be inºated. I have also suggested 
that when affective forecasting is likely to go wrong, a form of libertarian 
paternalism, steering without blocking choices, may be best. For people 
with diverse views about government policy—for those on the right, the 
left, and places in between—libertarian paternalism may well be able to 
attract broad appeal. The broadest point is that to the extent that affective 
forecasting errors turn out to be serious, the use of WTP is hard to justify 
from the standpoint of the very account that most plausibly supports it. 
 